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ABSTRACT
In the 1830s the British and American economies were hit by a series of shared  macroeconomic
shocks. This paper investigates the role of markets for Americas State bonds in  Britain and the U.S.
during and between the crises in 1837, 1839, and 1842. There is strong evidence that the crises in
1839 and 1842 originated in the U.S. and spread to Britain. There is also strong evidence that credit









College Park, MD 20742
and NBER
wallis@econ.umd.edu1
During the 1830s and 1840s, the British and American economies experienced a series of
shared macroeconomic fluctuations.  A sharp financial crisis in May of 1837 was followed by a
brief  recovery in 1838 and 1839.  A second financial crisis in October of 1839, while less severe
than the panic in 1837, nonetheless produced a recession and deflation that lasted until 1843.  A
third financial crisis, in the winter of 1842, affected primarily the United States, although
conditions continued to deteriorate in Britain through 1842 as well.  The two economies were
closely linked by trade and finance, leading historians to speculate about the role of each country
in provoking the crises.  Temin’s Jacksonian Economy attributes the Panic of 1837 and the Crisis
of 1839 to the Bank of England and international factors, absolving the Bank of the United
States, Nicholas Biddle (the bank’s president from 1823 to 1839), and President Andrew
Jackson.  Biddle himself criticized the Bank of England for its policies in 1839, as did Jenks and
Hammond.
1  On the other side, in A Study in Trade-Cycle History, Matthews concluded that ‘... it
is in the nature of things futile to try and draw any hard-and-fast line assigning to either country
causal primacy in the cycle as a whole or in its individual phases.  But enough has been said in
the present chapter to indicate the powerful nature of forces making for instability from within
the United States in this period.’
2 
The market for American state debts played a central role in financial relationships
between Britain and the United States in the 1830s.  In the mid-1830s American states embarked
on a internal improvement boom, raising the amount of state debt outstanding from $81 million
in 1835 to $198 million in 1842.   American states authorized and issued bonds worth $13
million in 1836, $21 million in 1837, $35 million in 1838, $22 million in 1839, $19 million in
1840, and $6 million in 1841.  By 1841, estimates are that half of the $200 million in state debt2
was held abroad, primarily in Britain.
3  State bonds provided a critical link between financial
markets in the two countries.  By 1836, state bonds were the only long-term American debt
instrument traded in Britain because the United States retired all its federal debt in 1835.  The
single American corporation whose stock traded regularly in London was the Second Bank of
the United States, which lost its national charter in 1836.  Millions of dollars of identical state
bonds traded in London, New York, and Philadelphia.  Movements in bond prices give us a
window into the connections between British and American financial markets.
The boom in state transportation and banking projects, and the associated wave of new
state bond issues, also play a critical role in our understanding of macroeconomic events.  Temin
attributed the quick recovery of the American economy from the Panic of 1837 to state
expenditures for canals and railroads, financed largely by British lending. ‘The recession of
1837-38... was brought to a speedy end by the restoration of the capital flow from Britain to the
United States and by the expansion of demand stemming from the rise in state government
expenditures.’ Temin attributed the 1839 crisis to credit tightening by the Bank of England and
the long recession that followed to tightening markets in Britain for American state debts:  ‘The
state projects initiated in the late 1830s had been started in the expectation of external [British]
financing....  Unfortunately, the new inflow of foreign capital did not continue [in 1839]... and
the manifold projects of the states were abandoned.’
4  By the summer of 1842, eight states and
the Territory of Florida were in default on their debts, and Mississippi and Florida had
repudiated their bonds outright.  The collapse of state credit was the most serious consequence of
the depression that began in 1839.
5
Our purpose here is to determine whether credit markets for American state bonds in and
between the three major financial crisis were tighter in the United States or in Britain, and
whether shocks to the bond markets originated in the United States or in London.  We ask three
questions.  First, were British and American financial markets well integrated?  Not surprisingly,3
we find that they were.  Financial markets effectively arbitraged the prices of American state
bonds in London and the U.S. within a band attributable to the high transaction costs of trans-
Atlantic commerce in this period.  Because markets were integrated we can ask whether the
pattern of bond price movements in the Crisis of 1839 and the Collapse of 1842 were consistent
with shocks originating in the United States, in Britain, or neither country.  We find clear
evidence that shocks in both crises originated in the United States.  Finally, we ask whether bond
price movements suggest that British investors were unwilling to lend to America after 1839. 
We find that yields on American state bonds in 1840 and 1841 tended generally to be lower in
London than they were in the United States, suggesting that British lenders purchased American
state debt on favorable terms relative to lenders in New York and Philadelphia.  The crises in
1839 and 1842 began in the United States, and between the two crises credit markets for state
debt in the United States demanded higher yields and paid lower prices on American state bonds
than did markets in London.  We find little evidence that the market for state bonds collapsed
because of pressures emanating from Britain.  In the final section of the paper we identify the
forces operating in America, neglected in virtually all accounts of this era, that produced the
collapse.
I. The History
The early 1830s were a period of general economic expansion in both Britain and the
United States, marred by a brief recession in 1834.  The expansion turned into a boom in 1835,
driven by a rapid increase in public land sales in the United States.  The boom was reflected in
rising prices in both countries, an increase in international trade, and an increase in the flow of
capital from Britain to the United States.  Prices stopped rising in early 1837, and a sharp break
in cotton prices combined with tight credit conditions in Britain and the United States to produce
a financial panic in May of 1837.  In the United States the panic resulted in the suspension of4
specie payments by banks throughout the country, and in Britain the failure or near failure of
several large commercial houses engaged in the American trade.  The Bank of England did its
part to bring about the panic by raising the Bank Rate from 4 to 6 percent and, significantly, by
refusing to discount bills arising from the American trade in July of 1836. ‘A part of this action
was the absolute refusal of the Bank’s Liverpool Agent, no doubt under orders, to handle paper
drawn from America on those firms.’
6  Figure 1 shows the Bank Rate, short term interest rates in
London and New York, and the New York price of 60 day bills payable in London.  
The effects of financial tightening were compounded in the United States by the decision
of the federal government to distribute the federal fiscal surplus of $36 million to the states in
1837, and by President Jackson’s specie circular requiring that all public land purchases be
redeemed in specie.  The two measures together disrupted the normal allocation of gold reserves
within the banking system, further exacerbating the liquidity problems of New York banks
brought on by tightening international markets.
7
The Panic of 1837 was followed by a year of bank specie suspensions in the United
States, financial distress in Britain, deflation in both countries, and a sharp decline in the volume
of trade in 1838.  But the  recession was shortlived.  By the fall of 1838 land sales, international
trade, prices, and capital flows had all turned up again.  Banks in the United States resumed
specie payments in the summer of 1838.  As Temin stressed, the quick recovery in the United
States was partly the result of fiscal stimulus created by the rapid expansion of state borrowing to
build canals, railroads, and banks.  Mid-Atlantic states had been borrowing since the 1820s to
build canal networks, beginning with New York’s Erie Canal in 1817.  In 1836 a second wave of
borrowing began, both in the older states – New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Ohio – and
in a new group of states in the west – Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Arkansas, and Mississippi. 
Table 1 provides debt authorized by year from 1830 to 1841.
8  This was peacetime fiscal5
expansion on a scale never witnessed in the young United States.
The transportation boom, however, died quickly in the Northwest.  Indiana, Illinois, and
Michigan all sold bonds on credit to eastern investment banks.  These new states issued bonds
for which they were liable for interest payments immediately, but for which they would receive
payments only in installments.
9  In July of 1839, the Morris Canal and Banking Company of
New Jersey defaulted on Indiana, and the state quickly was forced to curtail construction on its
network of canals and railroads.  By the fall, Illinois and Michigan were forced to slow or stop
construction when investment banks defaulted on their obligations to the states.  Land sales and
land values in these northwestern states had been rising steadily through the 1830s.  When
transportation construction stopped, land values and property tax revenues began falling and, by
late 1839, it was apparent that these states would soon have trouble servicing their debts.
10  In
January of 1841, Indiana was the first state to default on interest payments.  Table 2 lists the
states that defaulted on interest payments, the date of default, whether the state resumed
payments or repudiated their debts, and if they resumed, the date of resumption.  
The collapse of internal improvement projects in the Northwest was not the only
economic problem in 1839.  The Bank of England, again facing drains on its specie reserves,
began raising the Bank Rate in the summer (Figure 1).  A crisis broke out in the United States
when the Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania (the BUSP) suspended specie payments in
October.  This was followed by suspensions throughout the western and southern parts of the
United States, but not in New York and New England.  As Hammond and Smith emphasize, the
BUSP’s immediate problem in 1839 was domestic, not foreign.  Pressure from New York and
Boston banks forced the BUSP to suspend.
11
Although 1839 marked the end of the Northwestern transportation boom, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania continued to authorize new debt issues for their canals (Table 1). 
Despite rising interest rates, 1838, 1839, and 1840 were years of substantial state borrowing.  We6
can test Temin’s conjecture that the end of British willingness to lend to American states after
1839 brought on the crisis and contributed to the depression that followed. Figure 2 shows
average yields to maturity in the London market between 1831 and 1843 for the bonds of New
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Figure 3 provides similar
average yields in the United States for the bonds of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Illinois.
12  Economic historians have tended to focus on the Panic of 1837, to pay some attention
to the Crisis of 1839, and to ignore the Collapse of 1842.  The figure suggests we may have
missed the biggest crisis of them all.  What happened in 1842?
II. Market Integration
Figures 2 and 3 are constructed from data collected by Richard Sylla, Jack Wilson, and
Robert Wright (SWW).
13  They gathered quotations on debt and equity prices from contemporary
newspapers in London, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and other American cities.
14 
Prices are available for American markets from the early 1790s up to the 1850s.  Prices in
London are only available from 1811 to 1843.  State government bonds typically traded in New
York, Philadelphia, and London, as well as in the regional market of issue (for example,
Maryland bonds in Baltimore and Massachusetts bonds in Boston). SWW list over 100 bonds
from 18 states trading at some point in London.  Trading occurred in new issues and the
secondary market. Bonds traded actively for a few months after they were issued, but perhaps
because bonds were held mostly by long-term investors, relatively few bonds continued to trade
regularly in the secondary market.  The most consistent series are available for New York,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio. 
  New issues were marketed by the states themselves and through the agency of
investment banking intermediaries.  Legislation authorizing bond issues typically required that
bonds be sold at par or better.  The par restriction clearly applied to new issues marketed by7
states, sometimes applied to issues by intermediaries, and never applied to the secondary
market.
15  When prices in the secondary market dropped below par, states and their agents could
not sell new bonds at par.  States could accurately claim that  new bonds could not be sold in
New York or London, even when simultaneously there was an active secondary market in state
bonds in both markets.  What states often failed to say is that there was no market for bonds with
par sales restrictions when the market price fell below par.  The inability of states to market their
bonds was usually a function of their unwillingness (or their agents’ inability) to borrow at
higher interest rates.  States that were willing to borrow at market rates could always borrow.
Fortunately, most state bonds are reported with their yield and maturity, e.g., ‘New York
5's 1854.’  This enables us to calculate, for each individual bond, its yield to maturity.
16  For each
state we calculate the average yield to maturity for all the bonds traded in each market, e.g.,
‘Ohio Bonds trading in New York.’  This is a simple average because there is no information
available on trading volumes to provide us with weights.  There are often significant gaps in the
series, and some of the short-term fluctuation results from changes in the bonds reported in a
particular week.  The ‘United States’ yields we quote for Ohio, New York, and Illinois bonds
come from the New York market, and for Pennsylvania bonds the yields are from the
Philadelphia market.
Visual examination of the bond yields in Figures 2 and 3 suggests that the market for
state bonds in London and in the United States were closely related. To investigate the
relationship more formally, we ran a series of ARCH tests.  Yit is log of the average bond yield in
country ‘i’ on date ‘t’, ai is the constant term for country i, and εit is the market specific
disturbance term:
(1)  Yit =  ai + εit
The errors in equation (1) follow a multivariate normal distribution with auto regressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH):
178
(2) E(εit) = aij + bij E(εit-1εjt-1)
The dependent variable, Yi is average yield to maturity (YTM) in market i, of bonds that
were commonly traded in both markets.  The ai are constant terms measuring the log of the
average bond yield in each market.  The aij estimate the constant element of the covariance
between yields in the two markets.  In an integrated market the aij should be close to zero.  The
bij estimate the effect of the lagged disturbances on the covariance between the prices in the two
markets.  The bij measure whether the covariance of the  disturbances are related to lagged
disturbances.  That is, for example, whether last period’s errors in London affects this period’s
errors in New York.  In an integrated market the bij should be close to one.  If the errors in the
two markets were related, and they were, this is evidence that the two markets were integrated.  
The calculation of YTM of a bond requires the maturity, coupon rate and the weekly
prices of the bond, and there are missing observations on Y when not all of these data are
available.  Missing observations can be dealt with in several ways.  First, we linearly interpolate
for the unobserved data, and then run regressions using weekly and monthly data.
18  Second,
monthly data contain far fewer missing observations and give us a check on the robustness of the
results using weekly data, but at a loss of significant number of observations.  The monthly data
are realistic, however, given the time lags involved in the flow of information between the U.S.
and Britain in the early 19
th century.  Finally, we estimate a regression using only observed
weekly data, using our own method of analysis (described in the appendix) to account for
missing observations. 
The regression results are provided in Table 3. The first column uses the weekly sample
of linearly interpolated bond yields, the second column the monthly sample of linearly
interpolated yields, and the third column is based only on the observed monthly data using our
adjustment for missing observations.  The results indicate strong evidence for integration.  The
constant covariance of returns in the two markets, the aij , are very close to zero.  The effect of9
lagged disturbances on the covariance of returns, the bij, are positive and very close to one,
indicating that shocks to one market are quickly reflected in yields in the other market.  These
results are unaffected by the use of linearly interpolated weekly or monthly data, or controlling
for the presence of missing observation in the design of the estimator.
For comparison, Table 4 performs a similar exercise on stock price indexes in London
and in American markets.  Missing observations are not a problem with the market indices.  We
have run regressions on weekly prices, the change in weekly prices, and monthly prices.  Unlike
the bond markets, where the underlying securities are the same in both markets, the equities
traded in the London market are different from the equities in the American markets.  As with
the bond market, however, there is substantial evidence of market integration. 
Although the markets were well integrated, transacting between the two markets were not
costless.  Differences in interest rates between London and New York of one half to a whole
percentage point in yields (100 basis points) often persisted for several months, longer than the
one to two-month time it took for news to travel across the ocean.  We should not be surprised
by this, for in the 1830s bank notes of Philadelphia banks typically traded at a ¼ to ½ percent
discount in New York in times when there was no default risk.  The discount merely reflected
the time and effort involved in presenting the bank note to the issuing bank for redemption.  It
was possible for bond yields to be higher in New York than in London, but not too much higher.
III. American State Bonds in London and the United States: 
Figures 2 and 3 show the average yields of state bonds traded in London and the United
States, but disentangling what happened in the three financial crises requires examining states
individually. The five largest state borrowers were Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New York, Ohio,
and Maryland (Table 1).  Louisiana and Maryland were not steady borrowers and we do not have
consistent records on their bond yields.  New York began borrowing in 1817 and Ohio in 1825. 10
Both states completed their major canal projects in the early 1830s.  Both states resumed 
borrowing in 1837, and borrowed heavily and regularly through 1842.  Hence, there are long and
fairly complete bond yields for those states before 1834 and after 1837, but only sporadic
information in 1835, 1836, and 1837.  Pennsylvania began borrowing in the 1820s and continued
to borrow through the 1830s, so there are long and fairly complete records for Pennsylvania. 
Illinois, Indiana, and Massachusetts did not begin borrowing heavily until 1837.  We have only
sporadic quotations for those three states.  We focus, therefore, our anaylsis on the bonds of New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
Table 5 gives average bond yields to maturity for New York and Ohio bonds in both
London and the United States by year from 1831 to 1836 and by quarter from 1837 to 1843; the
standard deviation of the yields in each year; and the average difference in yields in the two
markets.
19  Figures 4 and 6 graph weekly bond yields for New York and Ohio bonds in both
markets, and Figures 5 and 7 graph the contemporaneous U.S.-London difference in yields for
New York and Ohio bonds.  Table 6 presents the same information for Pennsylvania bonds, as
well as the difference between the yield of Pennsylvania bonds in Philadelphia and the average
yield of New York and Ohio bonds in New York.  Figures 8 and 9 graph Pennsylvania bond
yields in Philadelphia and London, and the U.S.-London difference in yields.  Table 7 presents
the infrequently reported yields we have for Illinois, Massachusetts, and Indiana.
The individual state series show the same pattern as the aggregate series: bond yields rise
gradually in 1837, rise sharply in the fall of 1839, and rise and fluctuate wildy in the winter of
1842.  The spread in bond yields between the U.S. and London, however, moved differently in
each crisis.  The bond yield spreads reflect how expectations and information differed in the
United States and London.  To exploit the yield spreads, however, we first need to appreciate the11
situation in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania:
New York began the Erie Canal in 1817 and completed it in 1825; Ohio began
construction on two canals in 1825 and completed them in 1832; and Pennsylvania began work
on its canal system in 1826 and completed the Main Line in 1835.  By 1836, the New York and
Ohio canals were returning revenues to the state Treasury in excess of operating costs and
interest payments, while the Pennsylvania canals were a financial disaster.  Financial markets
priced the bonds of the three states accordingly.  In the early 1830s, yields on Pennsylvania
bonds were consistently higher than the yields on New York and Ohio bonds, usually 0.5 percent
or more (Table 6, column 5).
20
Pennsylvania’s situation changed in 1836.  When Nicholas Biddle lost the Bank War to
Andrew Jackson, the Bank of the United States sought a charter from the state of Pennsylvania. 
In 1836, the BUS was rechartered as the Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania.  The charter
was very generous to the state, including a promise by the BUSP to underwrite $6 to $8 million
in state bond issues:
The Bank committed to pay an additional “twenty installments of  $100,000 each,
beginning June 1, 1836 and continuing for the next nineteen years, to pay $500,000 on
March 3, 1837, to subscribe for various specifically designated public improvement
stocks amounting to $675,000, to make long term loans to the state up to $6,000,000 for
which the state agreed to turn over to the Bank bonds redeemable in 1868 (at par if they
were 4 per cent bonds at one hundred and ten if they were 5's) and to make temporary
loans up to a maximum of $1,000,000 in any one year at 4 per cent interest.”  (Smith,
Economic Aspects, p. 179) 
In 1837, the yields on Pennsylvania bonds suddenly became fixed within narrow limits. 
Between November 1837 and April 1839 the maximum yield on Pennsylvania bonds in
Philadelphia was 4.65 percent, the minimum yield was 4.42 percent (Table 6).  The standard
deviation on the Pennsylvania yield in 1838 was .02 percent, the lowest standard deviation for12
any state’s bonds in any year in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  Deliberately or not, the BUSP pegged the
price of Pennsylvania bonds as a result of its obligations to purchase state bonds over this 18
month period.  Other lenders were not so optimistic about Pennsylvania, however.  From 1837 to
1840 yields on Pennsylvania bonds in London remained considerably higher than yields in
Philadelphia.
21
The BUSP’s condition worsened in 1839, when its extensive operations in the state bond
market, the cotton market, and the market for international and domestic exchange went sour.
22 
In October of 1839, the BUSP was forced to suspend convertibility of its demand liabilities into
specie because of a run by New York and Boston Banks.  The suspension of payments
precipitated a banking crisis in the United States; with banks in the south and west suspended
until 1842.  But the suspension did not release the BUSP from its obligations to the state of
Pennsylvania.  Until early 1841, although the BUSP no longer pegged the yield, Pennsylvania
bonds continued to enjoy lower yields in Philadelphia, despite steady borrowing by the state,
than did the bonds of Ohio and New York in New York or London.  
In February 1841, the state attempted to force the BUSP to resume specie payments,
whereupon the bank closed its doors and went out of business. With BUSP out of the market,
yields on Pennsylvania bonds in Philadelphia jumped immediately, from 6.01 percent on January
2 to 9.5 percent on March 7.  For the remainder of 1841, Pennsylvania bond yields were above 8
percent in Philadelphia, and prices on Pennsylvania bonds were no longer quoted in London. 
Yields on Pennsylvania bonds were now 2 percentage points higher than yields on New York
and Ohio bonds.  The BUSP’s artificial support of state credit between 1837 to 1840 makes 
problematic the use of Pennsylvania bond prices as a indicator of market conditions in those
years.
Pennsylvania was in deep financial trouble in 1841.   The state’s credit returned to a level13
consistent with its financial situation when the failure of the BUSP forced the state back into
regular credit markets.  In late 1841, yields on Pennsylvania bonds in Philadelphia began rising
rapidly.  Pennsylvania defaulted on its bond obligations in 1842, with devastating consequences
for the state bond market on both sides of the Atlantic.
The Crises of 1837 and 1839: 
  The Panic of 1837 occurred in a window of time where bond price data are hard to come
by.  First, New York completed work on its canals in the 1820s and Ohio in the early 1830s. 
New York paid off most of its debt by 1835.  Although both New York and Ohio started new
projects in 1836 (New York authorized a $2,000,000 bond issue in 1836), neither state borrowed
heavily until later in 1837.  As a result, there are gaps in the quotation series for both states in
1837, reflecting the absence of marketable bonds in both New York and London.  Second,
western states had just begun issuing bonds when the Panic hit, and we do not have usable price
series for Indiana or Illinois in 1837.  With the exception of Pennsylvania, not many state bonds
traded in the spring of 1837. 
Between 1831 and 1836, the yield differential between the United States and London was 
small on average: .0013, only13 basis points.  Yields were slightly lower in London than New
York, consistent with the general idea that credit markets were deeper and interest rates lower in
London, as well as with higher transaction costs of marketing American bonds in Britain.
23 The
average difference for Pennsylvania bonds was .003, for New York bonds .001, and for Ohio
bonds -.0008 (on average Ohio bonds had slightly higher yields in London than in New York).  
As we saw earlier, these markets were well integrated. 
Bond yields began rising in 1836, a full percentage point in the U.S. and almost 3/4 of a
percentage point in London.  Credit markets tightened everywhere in 1836 (Figure 1).  Yields
continued to rise through early 1837 in both London and the U.S., but more quickly in the U.S.. 
When the Panic broke out in May, however, yields moved in opposite directions in the U.S. and14
in Britain.  In the third quarter of 1837, yields on New York bonds in London rose to 5.46
percent, while in the U.S. they fell to 3.94 percent (Table 5, columns 1 and 2).  For the remainder
of 1837, all of 1838, and the first three quarters of 1839, it was more expensive for state
governments to borrow in London than in New York or Philadelphia.  Both 1838 and 1839 were
years of heavy new state borrowing and there were frequent quotations in every market.  In the
aftermath of the Panic of 1837, credit markets for American state bonds were significantly
tighter in London than in the United States.
The summer of 1839 was a turning point for the transportation boom in the northwest. 
The Morris Bank defaulted on its July installment to Indiana.  As the year progressed it became
clear that Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois were in serious trouble, a concern immediately
reflected in yields on their bonds.  Indiana bond yields in London rose from 5.92 percent in June,
to 8.76 percent in November (Table 7, there are no quotes in between those dates in London, and
there are no quotes for Indiana bonds in New York before 1840).
24  Illinois bonds in New York
went from a yield of 4.9 percent in July to 11.1 percent in November and 13 percent in
December, while in London Illinois bonds went from a yield of 5.98 percent in July to 7.32
percent in January.  Financial markets acknowledged that it was primarily the western states
whose credit was threatened.  Yields on eastern state bonds rose in 1839, but not nearly to the
extent of yields on western bonds.
The BUSP once again suspended specie payments in October, 1839.  This crisis hit U.S.
markets for state bonds much harder than it hit the London market.  In the third quarter of 1839,
the average yield on New York bonds was 5.19 percent in the U.S. and 5.04 percent in London. 
In the fourth quarter of 1839, the average yield on New York bonds was 7.76 percent in the U.S.
and 6.19 in London.  For the remainder of 1840 and 1841, average yields stayed higher in the
U.S. than in London.  The New York-London differential on New York bonds was over 0.5
percent throughout both years (Figure 5); for Ohio bonds, between 0.1 and 0.5 percent (Figure15
7); and for Illinois bonds over a full percentage point or more.  Unlike the aftermath of the Panic
of 1837, when markets for state bonds were tighter in London than they were in the United
States, after the Crisis of 1839 markets for state bonds were distinctly tighter in the United States
than in London.
We are now in a position to examine the origin of the shock to bond markets.  Figures 5
and 7, the difference in New York and Ohio bond yields in the United States and London, show 
distinct spikes in the U.S.-London yield differentials at the end of 1839.
25  This is the first spike
in the bond differentials, small compared to what was to come in 1842, but telling nonetheless. 
Up to 1839, markets in New York, Philadelphia, and London shared the same information.  In
the fall of 1839, news hit the markets in America first.  Bond prices dropped and yields rose in
New York about two months before yields rose in London.  Unlike 1837, when credit conditions
tightened on both sides of the Atlantic and the news about the Panic of 1837 did not originate in
either country, in 1839 the event that shocked bond markets clearly originated in the United
States.
26
Temin suggested that American states were forced to abandon their internal improvement
projects after the Crisis of 1839 because British capital dried up.  His conjecture finds no support
in the financial market data.  After the Panic of 1837, it was consistently more expensive for
states to borrow in London than in New York and Philadelphia.  After the Crisis of 1839, it was
consistently cheaper for states to borrow in London than in New York and Philadelphia, and this
was true for all states.  States, of course, found it harder to borrow everywhere in 1840 and 1841,
when yields on New York and Ohio bonds reached 7 percent, and yields on Illinois and Indiana
bonds went to 8 percent and higher.  But it was not relatively harder to borrow in London than it
was in America. The idea that the depression that developed in the United States after October
1839 was due to the tightening of British capital markets is not supported by the bond yields.
Although yields were more favorable to borrowers in London than in the U.S., states16
found it difficult to borrow in both the U.S. and London in 1840.  States with par restrictions on
their bonds could not market any bonds at prevailing rates.  But they could sell bonds if they
were willing to pay market rates.  For example, Illinois had issued bonds to state contractors in
lieu of cash payments, bonds the contractors had accepted at par.  When state agents went to
London in July of 1840, they took both new state bonds with par restrictions and contractor
bonds.  The contractor bonds were identical to the new bonds in every respect except the par
restriction.  ‘None of the state bonds were sold, but an agreement was made to sell $1,000,000 of
the contractors’ bonds to Magniac, Smith and Company of London at a rate of eighty-three.’
27
Ohio continued to borrow through 1843, authorizing new bond issues at less than par.  The state
was able to sell $400,000 in bonds in July of 1840 to Barings at a price of 95 and an additional
$400,000 in bonds in May of 1842 at ‘the distressingly low price of 60.’
28   States could borrow,
but not if they insisted on selling 5 or 6 percent bonds at par. 
The Collapse of 1842:  
Financial historians have paid little attention to the Collapse of 1842, but big things were
happening that year in the market for state bonds.  The collapse in state debt markets is
traditionally attributed to state defaults (Table 2).  The timing of defaults and bond yield
movements shows that the onset of the default crisis cannot account entirely for the collapse of
state debt markets. In 1841, Indiana and Florida defaulted in January, Mississippi in March, and
Michigan and Arkansas in July.  Yet yields on New York and Ohio bonds were not noticeably
higher in the first quarter of 1841 than they had been for most of 1840.  Although yields rose in
the second and third quarter of 1841, the increase was small compared to the jump that occurred
in the fourth quarter of 1841 and the first quarter of 1842.   Something happened in the winter of
1842 that shook American credit markets.  And it wasn’t just the defaulting states that
experienced a crisis in the winter of 1842: yields for issues of Ohio and New York bonds, states
that avoided default, spiked in the U.S. market as well.17
The crisis in the winter of 1842 originated in the United States.  The news hit American
markets first, American markets quickly increased the risk premium placed on American state
bonds, and London did not digest the news from American markets for several months.   In the
first quarter of 1842, the yield on New York bonds was 9.89 percent in New York and 6.62
percent in London; on Ohio bonds, 12.78 percent in New York and 8.86 percent in London; on
Illinois bonds, 43.74 percent in New York and 26.78 percent in London.  Figures 10, 11, and 12
focus on bond yield differences between January 1841 and December 1843 (these figures expand
the time scale of the data in Figures 5, 7, and 9).  As the default crisis unfolded in 1841, yields in
New York stayed close to yields in London.  But in January of 1842,  yields moved sharply
higher in the United States, peaking in late March.  Yields on New York, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania bonds were at least 8 percentage points higher in New York and Philadelphia than
the contemporaneous prices in London.
The shock was not transitory.  Bond yields remained higher in both markets through
1842.  But the disjunction between bond yields in the United States and in London was
transitory.  By April 17, 1842, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania bonds were again trading for
the same prices in London, New York, and Philadelphia.
29  For the second quarter as a whole,
yields were only 0.0028 (28 basis points) higher in New York than in London.  Markets were
well integrated, but the shock hit America first and, given the time it took information to
propagate to Britain, London did not react for over a month.
What happened?  Pennsylvania was the locus of the crisis.  As early as 1839,
Pennsylvania was in deep financial trouble, but BUSP loans masked the state’s weakness until
the state was forced back into regular credit markets.  After the BUSP failed in February 1841,
the yields on Pennsylvania bonds in Philadelphia began rising: from 5.76 percent in the last
quarter of 1840, to 8.05 percent in the first quarter of 1841, 8.43 percent in the third quarter,
11.42 percent in the fourth quarter, and 17.99 percent in the first quarter of 1842. 18
State chartered banks were not at liberty to refuse loans to the state government that
chartered them.  Throughout 1841, Pennsylvania leaned on its banks.   In November of 1841,
Pennsylvania announced that it would require a loan from all banks in the state equal to 5
percent of their capital.  The news that hit American markets in December 1841 and January
1842, as the state began gathering loans from its banks, was that Pennsylvania was actually
carrying out its threat to make the banks sustain the state credit through forced loans.  In
February of 1842, the state precipitated a banking panic in Philadelphia, when it attempted to
withdraw funds from the Bank of Philadelphia necessary to cover the interest payments due that
month.
30  At that point, the state had not yet decided whether it would rescue the state credit by
extorting more money from state chartered banks.  When Pennsylvania made it clear that it
would not force more loans from state banks in April of 1842, the crisis was over.  As a result of
the state’s decision not to press its banks it became inevitable that Pennsylvania would default on
its August 1842 interest payment, and Pennsylvania bond yields in London and Philadelphia
accordingly rose steadily until the third quarter.  Yields on Pennsylvania bonds would not fall
back below 10 percent until April of 1844, and the state resumed interest payments in February
1845.
Conditions were similar in New York, where the state pressed state chartered banks to
purchase state bonds.  New York bank holdings of state ‘stock’ rose from nothing in 1839 to
almost $7 million in 1842.  The New York state legislature met in emergency session in March
to consider how to deal with the impending state default.  It responded with the ‘Stop and Tax’
law of 1842, stopping borrowing, stopping construction on canals, and reinstituting the state
property tax.  These measures ended the crisis in New York bonds. 
Ohio relied heavily on its banks for funds.  Ohio raised $900,000 in 1842, $500,000 from
state chartered banks and the $400,000 borrowed through Barings in London.
31  As long as Ohio
continued its internal improvement projects, financial markets continued to purchase Ohio bonds19
at prices significantly below par.  Yields on Ohio bonds in New York and London remained over
10 percent until the second quarter of 1843.  Because Ohio could pressure its banks in a way that
it could not pressure financial markets, as interest rates rose the state issued more bonds to its
banks and fewer directly to financial markets.  When it did place new bonds, it placed them in
London, not in New York.
Rising yields on Ohio and New York bonds in late 1841 were not a response to the
default crisis in Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, Indiana, and Michigan.  The Governor of
Mississippi announced that he supported repudiation in early 1841.  When Mississippi and
Florida repudiated their bonds by legislative act in February of 1842 this was old news.  The
news in the winter of 1842 was the threat that New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania would
cannibalize their banks to keep state finances afloat.   Pennsylvania’s announcement of the
forced loan program in November 1841 gave concrete expression to the threat.  Throughout the
winter of 1842 it was not clear what additional steps states would take to deal with the crisis. 
Fundamental uncertainty drove bond prices down, bond yields up, and brought an end to any
hopes that states would be able to raise large amounts of capital at reasonable rates to continue
their internal improvement projects.  News of the threat and an appreciation of its magnitude 
took several months to reach Britain. 
The Collapse of 1842 was not brought on by tight credit markets in Britain after the
Crisis of 1839, but by a political crisis in the United States in the winter of 1842.  Even so,
financial markets sorted themselves out quickly.  Interest rates on all state debts would be higher
in April of 1842 than in October of 1841, but markets in London and New York would pay the
same yields on Ohio and New York bonds.  
V. Conclusions
In 1841, Nicholas Biddle argued that European conditions played an important role in the20
economic crisis in 1839, and one need go no further than Leland Jenks’s Migration of British
Capital or Bray Hammond’s Banks and Politics in America to see how much economic
historians have laid the blame for the depression of 1839 to 1842 at the feet of international
conditions.  Peter Temin made no bones about the centrality of British credit in bringing on the
Crisis of 1839 and the collapse of state internal improvement projects: ‘The state projects
initiated in the late 1830s had been started in the expectation of external [British] financing.... 
Unfortunately, the new inflow of foreign capital did not continue [in 1839]... and the manifold
projects of the states were abandoned.’  Three clear findings of this paper challenge this
traditional interpretation.
First, the conditions that brought on the Panic of 1837 could not have anything to do with
the crisis in American state debts after 1839.  The majority of state debt outstanding in 1841 was
incurred after Panic, not before.  The vast majority of debt in New York, Ohio, Massachusetts,
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Arkansas, Maryland, and Mississippi involved in the default crisis
was authorized in 1837 or later and issued long after the Panic of 1837 was over.  New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania continued to issue and market bonds in 1840 and 1841.
Second, before 1837 state bonds had marketed for a slightly higher prices (lower yields)
in London than New York and Philadelphia.  After the Panic of 1837, London markets for
American state bonds became noticeably tighter than American markets, during the three years
of the heaviest borrowing: 1837, 1838, and 1839.  Yet, when the BUSP suspended payments in
October 1839, the economic crisis set in, and bond yields rose sharply in both countries, yields in
London became significantly lower than yields in the U.S..  States such as Ohio and Illinois
could borrow at lower cost in London than in New York, and so they borrowed in London. 21
There is no evidence that British credit markets dried up relative to American markets after
1839.  States had more trouble borrowing in both markets, of course, and states were forced out
of the market entirely if they insisted on borrowing at par.  The collapse of state transportation
projects in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan in 1839 had nothing to do with credit markets in
London, and everything to do with the defalcation of American banks such as the Morris Canal
and Banking Company, which failed to pay states for bonds they had already accepted and on
which the states were liable to pay interest immediately.
Third, the movement of bond yields during the Crisis of 1839 and the Collapse of 1842
indisputably show that the shocks to financial markets originated in the United States and spread
to London, not the other way around.  As the economic crisis deepened in 1840 and 1841, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania put greater pressure on their own state chartered banks to buy
state bonds.  This was not because the states could not sell bonds in London, but because the
yields on those bonds in London, New York, and Philadelphia were justifiably rising. 
Pennsylvania’s forced loan policy, beginning in November of 1841, tipped American markets
into crisis.
Our focus on the market for state bonds in London and the United States precludes us
from drawing similar conclusions about the course of the overall economies of the United States
and Britain in these years.  That would require a great deal more time and space.  But we hope
we have given more weight to Matthews’s conclusion that ‘enough has been said in the present
chapter to indicate the powerful nature of forces making for instability from within the United
States in this period.’  22
1.Leland Jenks, Migration of British Capital, pp. 90-95, and Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics
in America, pp. 500-513, stress the importance of British capital markets and international forces
in bringing on the crises.  Nicholas Biddle, in a letter to John Clayton dated April 9, 1841, in
which he defended his actions at the Bank of the United States and attempted to explain why the
bank had failed after his departure as President, Biddle wrote: ‘I have just stated that the winter
of 1838-‘39 was a season of great abundance and ease in moneyed concerns, both in England
and this country; but England was soon after startled by the discovery that the grain crop was
deficient, and a demand arose for specie to export for grain, combined with some continental
loans, that changed the whole surface of affairs.  The Bank of England itself, after borrowing ten
millions of dollars from the Bank of France, was still so much drained for coin that it was forced
into very severe restrictive measures, which raised the interest of money to twice or three times
its usual rate.  The most injurious effect was on the stocks of this country [the U.S.], which were
no longer convertible in England, accept at great sacrifices.  These causes immediately reacted
on this country, producing the usual effects of embarrassment in the community and alarm
among the banks.’ In House Document #226, 29
th Congress, First Session, p. 488.
2. Matthews, Trade-Cycle, p. 69.
3.  See, for example, Scheiber’s Ohio Canal Era estimates of foreign holders of Ohio bonds,
Ratchford’s American State Debts, and McGrane Foreign Bondholders.
4.The first quote is from Temin, The Jacksonian Economy, p. 151 and the second quote from p.
153.
5.Temin, Jacksonian Economy, p, 157, citing Gallman’s unpublished estimates of annual GNP,
argues that the crises in the United States had a much larger effect on prices than on output. 
Also see Temin, ‘The Anglo-American Business Cycle’ where he shows that the American
Endnotes23
economy experienced greater price fluctuations over these business cycles, while the British
economy experienced greater fluctuations in real economic activity.
6.The quote is from Clapham, Bank of England, p. 153.  See Hidy, House of Baring, as well, pp.
205-24. 
7.Whether the Panic of 1837 in the United States was caused primarily by international or
domestic forces is a question with a long pedigree.  See Rousseau, ‘Jacksonian Monetary
Policy;’ Temin Jacksonian Economy and  ‘The Anglo-American Business Cycle, 1820-60;’ and 
Timberlake, ‘The Specie Circular and the Distribution of the Surplus’ and ‘The Specie Standard
and Central Banking in the United States Before 1860;’ and Macesich ‘Sources of Monetary
Disturbances in the United States, 1834-1845.’  Heavy land sales in 1835 and 1836 swelled
federal revenues just as the federal government had paid off the national debt.  The fiscal surplus
grew rapidly, and in 1836 plans were made to distribute $36 million to the states in four
quarterly installments in 1837.  See Bourne Surplus Revenue Act.
8.Table 1 reports debt outstanding on September 1, 1841.  The debt is listed by the year it was
authorized, since it is difficult to determine when individual bonds were sold.  The bottom three
rows of the table report the amount outstanding, the total debt authorized, and the total amount
ever issued (some debt had been retired by 1841).
9.The installments were fixed in time and amount.  The states were not paid when the banks sold
the bonds, these were not consignment or commission sales.
10.For detailed consideration of land values and property tax revenues in Indiana in these years
see Wallis ‘The Property Tax.’  Only Illinois continued to borrow, at extremely high rates, in an
attempt to maintain its credit and to continue construction.  The state was not successful at either
goal.  Heavy borrowing in 1840 saddled the state with debts the state would struggle to pay into
the 1850s, without any significant physical accomplishments.  The best overall history of state
investments in transportation is Goodrich Government Promotion. Goodrich has recently been24
supplemented by Larson Internal Improvements.  Details about Indiana can be found in Fatout
Indiana Canals and Illinois in Krenkel Illinois Internal Improvements. 
11.By 1839 the BUSP had an extensive operation in Britain headed by Samuel Jaudon, so
attributing the causes of the bank’s demise to domestic and international forces is complicated.
But the causes of the suspension in October of 1839 were a run on the Philadelphia bank by
banks in New York and Boston.  Hammond, ‘Chestnut Raid on Wall Street;’ Smith, Economic
Aspects.
12. The data underlying the figures is discussed in the next section.
13.Their database will soon be available at ICPSR: ‘Price Quotations in Early U.S. Securities
Markets.’
14.Price quotations were typically reported weekly, recorded by the date of the newspaper issue. 
Prices were not quoted on the same day in each market, and in several cases quotes were
provided for more than one day in each week.    Our analysis focuses on weekly quotations,
except where noted.  The Boston market data are not available from June 1841 to September
1843, and the New York series on Massachusetts bonds is incomplete.  The Baltimore market
data include complete data on generic ‘Maryland 5s’ and ‘Maryland 6s’ without maturity dates,
and the prices for specific Maryland bonds is spotty.
15.The restrictions states placed on intermediaries are difficult to track.  When the state
appointed a state official to sell bonds in New York or London, the official was clearly bound by
the par restriction.  When states used investment bankers the situation was less clear.  One would
think that once investment bankers had paid for the bonds, they would no longer be bound by the
par restriction.  Investment bankers who took consignment of bonds would be bound by the par
restriction.  Yet, for example, Nicholas Biddle and the BUSP took almost all of Mississippi’s
1838 issue of $5 million, paid for it on credit over the following year, and then failed to sell the
bonds in London.  The BUSP used $3,008,000 in Mississippi bonds as collateral for European25
loans, Smith, Economic Aspects, p. 218.  Altogether, the BUSP used almost $13,000,000 in state
bonds as collateral for loans in the fall of 1839 and winter of 1840. It is not clear why Biddle
didn’t sell the bonds, unless, perhaps, he could not because of concerns about par restrictions.
16.For simplicity, we assumed that all bonds matured on January 1 and paid a single annual
premium.  Bond yields for the last two years proceeding maturity were dropped from the
calculated averages.  Yields were calculated for bid and ask prices, and both bid and ask yields
were included in the market averages.  Unfortunately, the quotations for Maryland bonds did not
include a maturity.
17.The ARCH estimator is more fully described in an appendix available from the authors.  The
appendix also explain the estimation technique used to account for missing observations.
18.This is the first step of an EM algorithm – a popular tool for finding maximum likelihood
estimates in incomplete data problems.  See Meng and Rubin ‘Maximum Likelihood
Estimation.’
19.The difference is the arithmetic difference in the average prices for the year or quarter.
20.The near equivalence of New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania yields in 1836 is misleading,
since there were only 4 observations on New York bond yields in New York that year.  Most of
the New York bonds were paid off in 1836.
21.Why the price difference was not arbitraged away is something of a mystery.  It is possible
that the quoted Philadelphia prices reflect prearranged transactions in new bond issues between
the state and the BUSP.  Bond holders in the secondary market were not able to sell bonds to
BUSP at the low yields/high prices.  The BUSP held a large stock of Pennsylvania bonds, but
not the entire $30 million issued up to 1839.  If this was the case, then the stability of the quoted
price may not reflect the true price of Pennsylvania bonds on the open market.  In either case, the
use of the Pennsylvania bond yields for cross country comparisons is problematic.26
22.Details of the bank’s demise can be found in Smith, Economic Aspects, Hammond, Banks and
Politics in America, and Govan, Nicholas Biddle.
23.The idea that British credit markets were deeper than American goes back at least to
Callender, ‘Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises,’ whose essay lays out the importance
of British capital for American development and the role of American states in tapping foreign
and domestic credit markets to support internal improvements.
24.This may be because the Indiana bonds sold on credit to the Morris Bank were sent to
London, and from there to Amsterdam.  The Morris Canal and Banking Company took the
Indiana bonds it purchased on credit and used them to pay off the mortgage held on the canal by
Dutch creditors.  By the summer of 1839, the Morris Bank did not hold any Indiana bonds, it had
already sold or hypothecated all of them.  There is no published account of the incident that we
are aware of.  But the minutes of the Company’s Board of Directors are available at the New
Jersey State Archives, and the story can be tracked through them.
25.This is in the time interval when Pennsylvania bond prices are supported by the BUSP, so the
yield differential between Philadelphia and London becomes more negative.  This, however, is a
function of the BUSP support.
26.There is no possibility that a positive shock hit the London markets in October of 1839. 
Equity prices in London were falling, not rising in the late 1839, see Gayer, Rostow, and
Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation.
27.Krenkel, Illinois Internal Improvement, p. 122. 
28.Scheiber, Ohio Canals,pp. 140-158, quote from p. 152.  At a price of 60, the yield on a 6 per
cent bond was roughly 10 percent.  Ohio did not include a par restriction in the legislation
authorizing bond issues in 1836, so most Ohio bonds could be sold at any price.  Ohio did have
problems with price restrictions, however.  One issue of bonds had been sold for less than the27
legislated minimum and at one point markets in New York believed, erroneously, that the state
was about to default on bonds that had been sold in violation the legislated price. 
29.Bond prices moved sharply upward in London that week, New York bonds went from yields
of 6.38 percent to 8.05 percent and Ohio bonds from yields of 9.34 percent to 12.5 percent.  At
the same time, yields moved down in New York, bring yields in the two markets back into
parity. 
30.The funds Pennsylvania withdrew were the funds they had borrowed from other banks in the
state.  Pennsylvania did not default on its bonds until 1842, but they were several days late on an
interest payment in February because of the banking crisis.  The crisis in Pennsylvania and the
state’s interaction with its banks is described in Kettell ‘Debts and Finances’ and the
Pennsylvania Report in House Document 226, 29
th Congress, First Session.
31. Scheiber, Ohio Canals, pp. 140-158.  ‘During the remainder of 1842, the fund board
sustained installment payments on the three-year loans by issuing bonds to Ohio banks at prices
of 70 to 75 [yields of roughly 8 percent].  In this manner, nearly $700,000 of bonds were sold for
cash payments of only $500,000.’ p. 152.  As noted earlier, Ohio sold its bonds to Barings for a
price of 60.28
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Table 1
Debt Outstanding on September 1, 1841
By Year of Authorization
Thousands of dollars
Before State Percent
1830 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841  Totals1837-41
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  500  3,165 0  3,478  5,079  1,306  13,527  100%
Indiana 0 0 0  200 0  1,790  227  7,771 0  1,400  1,363 0 0  12,751  83%
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0  100 0  5,020  451  40 0 0  5,611  98%
Alabama 100 0 0  3,800 0 0  1,600  2,400  5,000  2,500 0 0 0  15,400  64%
Florida 0 0 0 0  3,000 0  900 0 0 0  100 0 0  4,000  3%
Mississippi 0  500 0 0  1,500 0 0 0 0  5,000 0 0 0  7,000  71%
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  146  2,530 0 0 0 0  2,676  100%
Louisiana 3,200 0 0  7,000  12,000 0 0 0  600 0  1,185 0 0  23,985  7%
Ohio 3,800 600  0 100  0  0  0 170 550  1,710  3,476 149 369  10,924  57%
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1,900  2,200  1,644 0  225  5,969  100%
New  York 1,250 0 0  5,066  93 0 0  2,000  250  5,088  50  7,784  216  21,797  71%
Pennsylvania 6,959 4,000 3,016 2,649 3,271 2,265  960  0  0  15 6,289 3,754 3,159  36,336  36%
Maryland 146  597  0  0 1,122 3,020  40  20  500 8,775  903  0  92  15,215  68%
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  267  507  825  133  1,735  100%
Virginia 1,631  16 140  1,155 299 826 714  15 573 959  2,364  18  34 8,744  45%
South  Carolina 944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  2,148  600 0 0  3,691  74%
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  903  422 0 0 0  1,325  100%
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0  200  190 0  1,250  33  1,413 0  3,086  94%
Tennessee 0 0 0  500 0 0  35 0 0  2,881 0 0 0  3,416  84%
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  432 0  145 0  265  842  100%33
Total
Outstanding
18,029  5,713  3,156 20,470 21,285  7,901  4,775 13,212 21,425 35,066 22,177 19,023  5,798  198,030  52%
Total Authorized 20,739  5,716  3,156 20,471 21,350  7,909  7,220 18,589 21,609 41,617 26,795 27,377 12,170 
Total Ever Issued20,741  5,713  3,156 20,470 21,285  7,901  4,775 13,556 21,587 37,746 20,764 19,811  5,798 34
Table 2
Default, Resumption, and Repudiation Dates
Resumed
or 
State Date Repudiated Date
Indiana January 1841* Resumed July 1847
Florida January 1841 Repudiated February 1842
Mississippi March 1841 Repudiated February 1842
Arkansas July 1841 Resumed July 1869
Repudiated July 1884, Holford
Bonds
Michigan July 1841 Resumed January 1846
Repudiated
Partially 
Part paid bonds, July
1849
Illinois January 1842 Resumed July 1846
Maryland January 1842 Resumed July 1848
Pennsylvania August 1842 Resumed February 1845
Louisiana February 1843 Resumed 1844 
Repudiated ??35
Table 3 Bond market integration test (Multivariate ARCH with 2 equations)
Parameter











































Observations 1230 366 289
Time Period 1829-1843
Technical Note:
(1) 1: London market, 2: American market
(2) The first dependent variable is the average YTM of NY, PA and OH bonds in London. The second
dependent variable is the average YTM of NY and OH bonds in NYC and PA in Philadelphia.36
Table 4. Stock market integration test (Multivariate ARCH with 2 equations)
Parameter
Weekly data Monthly data



































































(1) 1: American market (Baltimore, Boston, New York and Philadelphia), 2: London market
(2) The average price in London is indexed by the average of the first years stock prices, because the
stock prices denoted in sterling and stayed around 25, where American prices stayed around 100. 37
Table 5
Bond Yields in the United States and London






London US Difference London US Difference
1831 mean 3.46% 3.49% 0.03% 4.04% 3.75% -0.29%
st. dev. 0.18% 0.13% 0.25% 0.26%
N 18 27  31 47 
1832 mean 3.16% 3.03% -0.12% 3.74% 3.35% -0.38%
st. dev. 0.18% 0.17% 0.26% 0.37%
N 28 14  42 44 
1833 mean 2.97% 2.84% -0.13% 3.53% 3.69% 0.16%
st. dev. 0.14% 0.12% 0.08% 0.34%
N 30 26  40 39 
1834 mean 2.90% 3.60% 0.70% 3.55% 3.86% 0.30%
st. dev. 0.04% 0.34% 0.07% 0.61%
N 36 26  42 34 
1835 mean 3.20% 3.06% -0.14% 3.61% 3.50% -0.11%
st. dev. 0.08% 0.48% 0.19% 0.54%
N 52 12  44 33 
1836 mean 4.57% 4.69% 0.12% 4.13% 4.48% 0.35%
st. dev. 0.46% 0.39% 0.11% 0.78%
N 12 4  30  29 
1837 Q1 4.71% 4.87% 0.16% --- 4.63% ---
Q2 --- 4.80% --- 5.09% 4.89% -0.20%
Q3 5.46% 3.94% -1.52% 5.28% 3.54% -1.74%
Q4 5.53% 4.44% -1.08% 4.97% 3.95% -1.02%
st. dev. 0.40% 0.39% 0.27% 0.60%
N 37 20  72 23 38
1838 Q1 5.03% 4.34% -0.69% 5.02% 4.34% -0.68%
Q2 4.76% 4.82% 0.05% 4.74% 4.79% 0.04%
Q3 4.66% 4.83% 0.17% 4.91% 3.76% -1.15%
Q4 4.69% --- --- 4.81% --- ---
st. dev. 0.19% 0.25% 0.15% 0.36%
N 55 12  54 13 
1839 Q1 4.96% 5.00% 0.04% 5.22% 4.51% -0.71%
Q2 4.95% 4.94% -0.01% 5.30% 4.32% -0.98%
Q3 5.04% 5.19% 0.15% 5.96% 4.83% -1.12%
Q4 6.19% 7.76% 1.57% 6.62% 7.46% 0.84%
st. dev. 0.47% 1.67% 0.61% 1.69%
N 43 9  44  11 
1840 Q1 5.62% 6.83% 1.21% 6.25% 6.51% 0.26%
Q2 5.55% 6.23% 0.68% 6.01% 6.30% 0.29%
Q3 5.50% 6.27% 0.77% 6.08% 6.73% 0.65%
Q4 5.70% 6.22% 0.52% 6.12% 6.26% 0.14%
st. dev. 5.60% 6.41% 6.12% 6.50%
N 52 40  56 46 
1841 Q1 5.87% 6.89% 1.02% 6.30% 6.45% 0.15%
Q2 6.47% 7.46% 0.99% 6.92% 7.01% 0.09%
Q3 6.53% 7.16% 0.62% 7.01% 6.20% -0.82%
Q4 6.75% 7.99% 1.24% 6.88% 7.31% 0.43%
st. dev. 0.34% 0.90% 0.36% 1.03%
N 94 85  98 71 
1842 Q1 6.62% 9.89% 3.27% 8.86% 12.78% 3.93%
Q2 7.70% 8.53% 0.83% 11.98% 11.70% -0.28%
Q3 7.37% 7.45% 0.09% 10.71% 10.94% 0.23%
Q4 7.32% 7.72% 0.40% 9.78% 11.86% 2.08%
st. dev. 0.50% 1.67% 1.51% 2.53%
N 46 51  25 51 
1843 Q1 6.64% 6.53% -0.11% 10.43% 12.08% 1.66%
Q2 5.85% 5.80% -0.05% 11.56% 9.62% -1.93%
Q3 5.51% 4.92% -0.59% 8.77% 7.23% -1.54%
Q4 4.86% 4.74% -0.12% 6.61% 5.76% -0.85%
st. dev. 0.74% 0.81% 2.17% 2.71%
N 41 50  43 50 39
Table 6
Bond Yields in the United States and London
Pennsylvania Bonds, and New York/Ohio average yield
PA PA -
PA PA US-London NY & Ohio NY & Ohio
London US Difference US Average Difference
1831 mean 3.92% 3.95% 0.03% 3.62% 0.33%
st. dev. 0.11% 0.03%
N 50 23 
1832 mean 3.59% 3.74% 0.16% 3.19% 0.55%
st. dev. 0.16% 0.08%
N 45 53 
1833 mean 3.61% 3.96% 0.34% 3.26% 0.69%
st. dev. 0.10% 0.20%
N 36 48 
1834 mean 3.89% 4.39% 0.50% 3.73% 0.66%
st. dev. 0.08% 0.27%
N 55 54 
1835 mean 3.97% 4.14% 0.16% 3.28% 0.85%
st. dev. 0.06% 0.18%
N 51 55 
1836 mean 4.12% 4.55% 0.43% 4.59% -0.04%
st. dev. 0.17% 0.26%
N 42 59 
1837 Q1 4.56% 5.02% 0.47% 4.75% 0.28%
Q2 4.94% 5.06% 0.13% 4.84% 0.22%
Q3 5.06% 4.40% -0.66% 3.74% 0.66%
Q4 4.78% 4.42% -0.37% 4.19% 0.22%
st. dev. 0.29% 0.35%
N 90 95 40
1838 Q1 4.87% 4.56% -0.31% 4.34% 0.22%
Q2 4.86% 4.55% -0.31% 4.80% -0.25%
Q3 4.83% 4.56% -0.27% 4.29% 0.27%
Q4 4.72% 4.55% -0.17% --- ---
st. dev. 0.07% 0.02%
N 55 47 
1839 Q1 4.96% 4.55% -0.41% 4.75% -0.20%
Q2 5.02% 4.87% -0.14% 4.63% 0.24%
Q3 5.31% 5.38% 0.07% 5.01% 0.37%
Q4 6.91% 6.14% -0.77% 7.61% -1.47%
st. dev. 0.62% 0.58%
N 42 40 
1840 Q1 6.73% 5.87% -0.86% 6.67% -0.79%
Q2 6.99% 5.96% -1.04% 6.27% -0.31%
Q3 6.30% 5.42% -0.87% 6.50% -1.07%
Q4 6.03% 5.80% -0.23% 6.24% -0.44%
st. dev. 6.45% 5.76%
N 58 56 
1841 Q1 5.78% 8.05% 2.27% 6.67% 1.38%
Q2 --- 8.34% 8.34% 7.23% 1.11%
Q3 --- 8.43% 8.43% 6.68% 1.75%
Q4 --- 11.42% 11.42% 7.65% 3.77%
st. dev. 0.15% 1.90%
N 22 84 
1842 Q1 14.87% 17.99% 3.12% 11.34% 6.65%
Q2 15.09% 21.86% 6.77% 10.12% 11.75%
Q3 22.72% 23.55% 0.83% 9.20% 14.36%
Q4 13.98% 18.85% 4.88% 9.79% 9.07%
st. dev. 3.51% 2.99%
N 27 42 
1843 Q1 15.89% 21.02% 5.13% 9.31% 11.71%
Q2 19.26% 19.20% -0.06% 7.71% 11.49%
Q3 16.21% 15.68% -0.53% 6.08% 9.61%
Q4 10.91% 12.53% 1.62% 5.25% 7.28%
st. dev. 3.67% 3.51%
N 36 48 41
Table 7
Bond Yields in the United States and London
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Indiana Bonds
Illinois Illinois MA Indiana
London US London London
1831 mean --- --- --- ---
st. dev. --- --- --- ---
N 0 0 0 0 
1832 mean --- --- --- ---
st. dev. --- --- --- ---
N 0 0 0 0 
1833 mean 4.35% --- --- ---
st. dev. 0.00% --- --- ---
N 10 0 0 0 
1834 mean --- --- --- 4.27%
st. dev. --- --- --- 0.01%
N 0 0 0  23 
1835 mean 5.28% --- --- 5.11%
st. dev. 0.00% --- --- 0.45%
N 1 0 0  28 
1836 mean --- --- --- 5.97%
st. dev. --- --- --- 0.18%
N 0 0 0  24 
1837 Q1 --- --- --- 6.19%
Q2 --- --- --- ---
Q3 --- --- --- 7.07%
Q4 --- --- --- 6.93%
st. dev. 0.38%
N 0 0 0  57 42
1838 Q1 --- --- 4.05% 6.37%
Q2 5.65% 4.89% --- 6.45%
Q3 5.64% --- 4.39% 6.79%
Q4 --- --- 4.41% 5.71%
st. dev. 0.02% 0.03% 0.07% 0.48%
N 26  4 26 45 
1839 Q1 5.83% 5.69% 4.42% 5.92%
Q2 5.89% --- 4.68% 5.92%
Q3 --- 5.92% 4.06% ---
Q4 --- 10.81% 5.95% 8.76%
st. dev. 0.06% 2.69% 0.66% 0.96%
N 25  9 38 23 
1840 Q1 7.10% 10.88% --- ---
Q2 7.32% 8.89% --- 8.41%
Q3 7.67% 8.80% 4.84% 8.10%
Q4 8.05% 7.97% 4.91% 8.22%
st. dev. 7.36% 8.76% 4.88% 8.16%
N 30 36 24 26 
1841 Q1 8.06% 12.65% 4.94% 8.36%
Q2 --- 13.60% --- ---
Q3 --- 12.68% --- ---
Q4 --- 23.53% --- ---
st. dev. 0.00% 6.37% 0.00% 0.09%
N 12 88 24 12 
1842 Q1 26.78% 43.74% --- 26.00%
Q2 29.81% 53.83% --- 35.68%
Q3 --- 46.85% --- 39.02%
Q4 --- 47.91% 5.03% 37.95%
st. dev. 4.89% 5.21% 0.00% 4.28%
N 14 50  7 33 
1843 Q1 --- 43.37% 5.11% 35.41%
Q2 26.98% 31.52% 4.93% ---
Q3 26.99% 23.24% --- 26.75%
Q4 --- 20.14% --- 24.80%
st. dev. 0.01% 9.82% 0.09% 3.03%
N 5 37  9 10 43444546474849505152535455
Notes to Figures and Tables:
Figure 1: Interest rates in the New York and Boston are the average of the high and low rates reported in Smith and Cole, Fluctuations, Table
74, pp. 192-3.
Interest rates in London: From National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bank Rate: Clapham, Bank of England, vol II, Appendix B, p. 199.
Exchange Rates on 60 day bills, Smith and Cole, Fluctuations, p. 190 and Officer, "Integration in the American Foreign Exchange Market," p.
563.
Figures 2 through 11: Sylla, Wilson, and Wright,  Price Quotations.
Table 1: “The William Cost Johnson Report.” House Report, 296, 27th Congress, 3rd Session, 1843.
The numbers for Ohio in the Johnson report are unreliable for the later years.  We include Scheiber’s, Ohio Canals, estimates of borrowing for
1840 and 1841, pp. 143-151, and the $20 million figure cited in the Census of 1880.
Table 2: English, “Sovereign Default.”
Tables 5 through 7: Sylla, Wilson, and Wright,  Price Quotations.Appendix to Kim and Wallis:
The Market for American State Government Bonds in Britain and the United States, 1830 to
1843.
Our multivariate ARCH model for market integration tests int the bond and stock markets is:
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Where   is the information set in time t-1. In the text, X contains only a constant term and n is Λt−1
equal to two. We  maximizing the following log likelihood function to estimate the parameters, a,
b, and B:
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Because the bond prices are not complete, we have missing data in the dependent
variable.  For our bench mark results, we linearly interpolated bond prices on the surrounding
observations.  This imputed series is used for the ARCH estimation. For example, if prices are
available in week 3 and week 5 in London, we linearly interpolate between the two prices to
obtain an estimate for week 4.
This imputation causes a consistency problem in our estimates, since the imputation is
not likely to be the true data generating process. We can get around this problem by iterating anEM algorithm process.  Imputation is the first step of the EM algorithm.  The standard second
step is to maximize the likelihood function to get parameter estimates, and then go back to the
first step to reimpute the data using the estimates.  By iterating these two steps, the estimates
converges to the true values in the limit. Instead, we develop a new method to estimate the
missing observations directly.  It is easier and faster than the EM algorithm iteration.
Suppose an observation is missing at time t-1. For example, the data are not available in
London in week 4, while the data are available in week 3 and week 5 in both markets. We take
the covariance matrix of time t, conditional on time t-2 disturbance terms, instead of time t-1
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In this fashion, we can represent the conditional covariance of time t with the time t-2
error terms. Generalizing this method recursively to the case where time (t-s) data are the latest
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Therefore, (a*, b*) has one-to-one nonlinear relationship to (a, b). Using this relationship,
we can adjust the likelihood function without changing the number of parameters we are
estimating:log log( ) log| |
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The covariance matrix is conditional on the latest observations available. The likelihood
function is still determined by a, b and B conditional only on the observed data. There is a
computational problem because the likelihood function is highly nonlinear on a and b, but the
consistency of the estimate is preserved.